model generates much less income disparity than is found in the data. Counter to the expectations of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992, p. 433), this is true even if the reproducible capital share is doubled by including human capital. Only if the share of reproducible capital is near one does a plausible disparity in tax rates generate as much income disparity as in the data. But then the convergence to the balanced growth path is slow, far slower than is consistent with the post-World War II development experience of Japan. Development miracles such as Japan's are just not possible with the reproducible capital income share near one.
If we are to account for both the huge observed income disparity and development miracles, it seems a new theory must be developed. In this paper we put forth a theory and show that it is quantitatively consistent both with the great disparity of per capita income across countries and with the rapid development of Japan and several other countries during the postwar period. The focus of our theory is the technology adoption decision by firms and the barriers to such adoption that are often placed in the paths of entrepreneurs. These barriers take different forms such as regulatory and legal constraints, bribes that must be paid, violence or threat of violence, outright sabotage, and worker strikes. Whatever their form, each has the effect of increasing the cost of technology adoption. Our theory is that differences in these barriers account for the great disparity in income across countries and that large persistent reductions in these barriers induce development miracles.
In emphasizing barriers to technology adoption and their relation to the process of development, we echo a theme advocated by several economic historians including Morison (1966) , Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) , and Mokyr (1990) . Rosenberg and Birdzell argue, in fact, that the reason why the West grew rich first was that effective resistance to technology adoption was weaker there. And all these authors document cases in which the adoption of technologies was met with fierce resistance. This paper can be viewed as an attempt to formalize and quantify some of these arguments.
We assume in the model that a firm must make an investment to advance its technology level. At a point in time the amount of investment required by a firm to go from one technology level to a higher level depends on two key factors: the level of general and scientific knowledge in the world and the size of the barriers to adoption in the firm's country. General and scientific knowledge, or world knowledge, is assumed to be available to all in the model and to grow exogenously. With growth in this knowledge, the amount of required investment that a firm must make to go from a particular technology level to a higher level is assumed to decrease. An implication of this last assumption is that when income levels and technology adoption barriers are held fixed, development rates increase over time. When just income levels are held fixed, we see that development rates have indeed increased over the last 170 years. This increase is documented in figure 1, which plots the number of years it took a country to go from 10 to 20 percent of 1985 U.S. per capita income against the year in which that country first had a per capita income level 10 percent of the 1985 U.S. level. Before 1913, the median length of this development period for a country was 45 years. Subsequent to 1950, the median length of this development period was 18 years. This is a dramatic reduction in the time taken to achieve this doubling of income. ' We emphasize that our theory is a theory of relative income levels and not growth rates. If the distribution of technology adoption barriers is constant over time, an implication of our theory is that the cross-country distribution of the log of per capita income shifts up over time with no increase in its range. Parente and Prescott (1993) document that this is precisely how the distribution of the log of per capita income in the 1960-85 period behaved for the 102 large countries in the Summers and Heston (1991) data set.
In order to quantify the model, we calibrate it to U.S. balanced growth observations and the postwar development experience of Japan. By construction then, the calibrated model is consistent with both U.S. development observations and the Japanese postwar development miracle. The critical test of our theory is whether it is also consistent with the huge observed income disparity across countries. We find that it is. For a plausible disparity in technology adoption barriers, our model generates disparity in per capita income across countries of the magnitude observed in the data. This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the economy. Section III calibrates the model to U.S. balanced growth observations and the postwar experience of Japan. Section IV examines the quantitative effects of differences in tax rates and barriers to technology adoption on balanced growth path output levels. Section V uses the calibrated model to interpret the postwar recovery of France and Germany and the development miracles of South Korea and Taiwan. Section VI consists of some final remarks. 
II. Model Economy
The economy is a generalization of the Parente (in press) technology adoption model. There is a business sector with a distribution of firms indexed by their initial technology levels. There is a household sector with measure L homogeneous households who value private consumption, leisure, and services generated from household physical capital. And there is a government sector that taxes income, provides public consumption, and makes transfers. The economy is described as follows. This output can be used for either consumption or investment.
A. Business Sector
There are no aggregate increasing returns to scale in our economy. The commodity space has many commodities. Workweeks of different lengths are different commodities, and firms with different technology levels have different types of technology capital. Thus there is a continuum of different types of both labor and technology capital inputs.2 Given certain restrictions on technology parameters, there is an optimal firm size, and it is small relative to the economy. As the size of the economy increases, the number rather than the size of firms adjusts. A proportional increase in every input results in the same proportional increase in the number of firms and aggregate output. In the aggregate, then, there are constant returns to scale. As in the neoclassical model, the aggregate production possibility set is a convex cone.
A firm can advance its technology level between time t and t + 1, provided that the firm is operated at date t and makes an investment at date t. The increase in a firm's technology level resulting from an investment of XA units of output depends on the firm's level of technology relative to the level of world knowledge at the time of the investment as well as the size of the barriers to technology adoption in the country in which the firm is located. These barriers to technology adoption reflect the various ways governments and groups of individuals increase the amount of investment a firm must make to adopt a more advanced technology.
World knowledge, which we denote by W, is meant to represent the stock of general and scientific knowledge in the world (i.e., blueprints, ideas, scientific principles, and so on). We assume that all firms have access to this knowledge. Thus general and scientific knowledge spills over to the entire world equally.3 We assume that world knowledge grows at the constant rate of y > O.' Thus Wt = WO(1 + y)t.
Given the level of world knowledge at date t and given a firm's current technology level, At, the amount of investment a firm must make to realize a technology level of At+1 > At at time t + 1 is
where TF is the parameter that indexes the size of barriers to technology adoption in the firm's country. As (3) makes clear, the technology 2 Rosen (1974) deals with an equilibrium with a continuum of differentiated products. Mas-Colell (1975) introduces this feature into general equilibrium theory. For a formal general equilibrium analysis with such commodity space, see Hornstein and Prescott (1993) .
3This is clearly a simplifying assumption. The amount of spillover will depend on a variety of factors, including the movement of individuals between profit centers. In an interesting paper, Schmitz (1989) studies an economy in which the amount of spillover depends on the technological closeness of industries. 4 For theories of the growth of world knowledge, see Romer (1990) 
when Nt = N or Yt = 0 when Nt = 0. In (7), pt is a constant that depends on W0, y, and (x. Variable Z will have the interpretation of a firm's stock of technology capital relative to world knowledge and variable Xz will have the interpretation of a firm's investment in that capital. In this representation, the stock of technology capital, Zt, at date t is measured in terms of the composite output good Yt. If technology capital is measured in this way, the ratio of technology capital to output, ZtIYt, remains constant along the balanced growth path. If technology capital were instead measured as A'" , technology capital would grow faster than output along the balanced growth path and its relative price would decrease at a rate equal to the growth rate of world knowledge.
There is an optimal-size firm in this economy if and only if the coefficients on physical capital and technology capital in (7) sum to less than one. The sum of ok and O is strictly less than one if and only if ox > Okl(l -ok). In what follows, we make such a restriction on the values of cx and Ok- In the model, a firm's technology capital is assumed to be embodied in the organization. Furthermore, we assume that all this capital is lost if the firm is not operated. These assumptions simplify model notation and analysis. Our results would not change if part of a firm's technology capital could be transferred to other firms if that firm were to be shut down.
The dividend of an operated firm at date t is Vft = Yt-w(ht)N -rktKt -Xt.
In ( 
Although the assumption concerning the initial distribution of firms seems restrictive, in actuality it is not. A key feature of the investment technology is that the return associated with a given investment is higher the lower the firm's current technology level. Parente (in press) shows that one implication of this type of investment technology is that it is optimal to allocate investments across firms so that the lower support of the distribution of technologies across operated firms is as large as possible. Since the highest investment will occur at those firms with the lowest levels of technology, it follows that after a finite number of time periods all firms will have identical technology capital stocks, provided that investment is uniformly bounded away from zero.
B. Household Sector
In this paper, we abstract from population growth and assume a continuum of infinitely lived households of measure L. We cannot and do not abstract from the labor/leisure decision or from household physical capital. The reason is that our estimate of the income disparity induced by a given disparity in the size of barriers to technology adoption would be quite different were we to abstract from these decisions. We introduce leisure and services generated from the stock of household physical capital to preferences in the standard way. The discounted utility stream of a household over its infinite lifetime is 
At date t, a household that works an ht-hour workweek receives labor income equal to wt(ht), physical capital income rktk,, and dividends from firms Vft. Labor income, physical capital, rental income less depreciation, and dividend income are all taxed at the rate T. All households receive identical lump-sum transfers from the government, vgt* The problem of the household is to maximize (12), subject to its household physical capital constraints (13), subject to its business physical capital constraints (14), and subject to its budget constraint of 
D. Equilibrium
The following equations along with equations (7), (8), (11), (13), (14), and (16) and the transversality condition are necessary and sufficient conditions for a competitive equilibrium: 
wt ( 
Equation (17) 
B. Postwar Japanese Development
We now determine for which OZ the model is consistent with postwar Japanese development, including its development miracle, as well as with U.S. balanced growth observations.7 If the Japanese barriers to technology adoption, rr, were constant for some reasonably long period in which there was a significant decline in annual growth rates and if the Japanese people expected r to remain at that level in subsequent periods, the Japanese growth path along with the U.S. balanced growth path observations would identify all model parameters including Oz and the Japanese Tr. But the assumption that we can 7The per capita income levels of Japan as well as per capita income levels of the other countries analyzed in Secs. IV and V come from Summers and Heston (1991). view the entire 1960-88 path of Japanese per capita output as though it were converging to some balanced growth path is not reasonable. An examination of figure 2, which plots Japan's per capita GDP relative to the U.S. level, suggests that a more reasonable working assumption is that in 1960-73, Japan was converging to some balanced growth path and in 1974 there was a regime change, that is, a persistent and unanticipated change in the magnitude of the technology adoption barrier parameter nr.8 As a result of this regime change, the Japanese economy was converging to a different balanced growth path during 1975-88. This leads us to treat the Japanese economy as though it were converging to the balanced growth path associated with some nr in 1960-73 and as though it were converging to the balanced growth path associated with some other rr for 1975-88.
For a given technology capital share, Oz, and the corresponding calibrated parameters, we find the value of n and beginning-ofperiod capital stocks for which the model's beginning-and end-ofperiod incomes match those of the Japanese economy. We emphasize that the values for all parameters, with the exception of policy parameter Tr, are assumed to be the same for the American and Japanese economies. Tax rates and government product shares are comparable but not identical for the two countries. As the results are not sensitive to these policy parameters, the abstraction of identical values for T and (u is employed. We also emphasize that we are assuming that the Japanese behaved in each period almost as though they expected the current value of or to persist indefinitely.
In choosing the capital stocks, we assume that the initial mix of household physical capital, business physical capital, and technology capital is such that the nonnegativity of investment conditions is not binding in the initial period. In no case that we considered was the nonnegativity of investment conditions binding at any point along the path. 60, for example, r must increase by 37 percent to match beginning and ending Japanese income levels in these two periods. Such an increase implies a change in the balanced growth path to which Japan was converging from 1.82 to 0.87 of the U.S. level.
Values of Oz < .50 also are unreasonable because they imply too large a decline in annual growth rates over the 1960-73 period relative to the data. For Japan, the difference between the annual average growth rate over the 1960-63 subperiod and the annual average growth rate over the 1970-73 subperiod is 2.7 percentage points. This is essentially the difference in average annual growth rates for these two subperiods implied by the model if Oz = .55. For Oz = .45, however, the difference in these average annual growth rates over these subperiods is 3.9 percentage points; when Oz = .40, this difference is 5.1 percentage points. This leads us to conclude that only Oz's in the range of .50 and .55 are consistent with both the U.S. balanced growth observations and the 1960-88 development experience of Japan.
The larger O is, the greater the disparity in balanced growth income levels induced by a given disparity in barriers ur. Because we are testing whether our theory is consistent not only with U.S. and postwar Japanese development but also with the observed disparity in income across countries, our subsequent analysis centers around the case in which Oz = .55. Table 2 What we find is that growth rates are lower the closer a country is to its balanced growth path, but the speed of convergence-that is, the fraction of the gap that is closed-is higher the closer a country is to its balanced growth path. For the calibrated model with Oz = .55, the speed of convergence goes from 2 percent per year at 25 percent of balanced growth income to 2.6 percent per year at 50 percent of balanced growth income to 4.0 percent per year at 95 percent of balanced growth income. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) get an average convergence rate slightly less than 2 percent per year. Our model, therefore, implies faster convergence than the Barro and Sala-i-Martin estimate, except at very low percentages of the balanced growth income.
We note that if Oz = .55, the theory persists that the Japanese workweek should have declined from 52. 
IV. Output Disparity
We now examine whether our theory is consistent with the huge observed disparity in incomes across countries. In particular, we analyze how the balanced growth income levels in the calibrated model depend on tax rates, T, and technology adoption barriers, -r, for various Or's for which the model is consistent with both U.S. and Japanese postwar development observations. Table 3 reports the effect of tax rates on relative balanced growth per capita incomes, and table 4 reports the effect of technology adoption barriers on relative balanced growth per capita incomes for our model calibrated to U.S. observations for various Or's. For any Oz that is consistent with Japanese development, namely Oz's between .55 and .50, we find that the effect of tax rates on balanced growth income levels is far too small to account for the huge observed income disparity across countries. For the calibrated model with Oz = .50, an increase in the tax rate on income from 0 percent to 90 percent reduces balanced growth incomes by less than a factor of three. For the calibrated model with OZ = .55, the level effects are larger, but only slightly so. For Oz = .55, an increase in the tax rate from 0 percent to 90 percent reduces balanced growth incomes by a factor of 3.3. What these numbers imply is that if tax rates were to explain the huge observed income disparity across countries, they would have to be nearly 100 percent in poor countries and nearly zero in rich ones. This is counterfactual and leads us to conclude that differences in tax rates cannot be the key to understanding the problem of development. While differences in tax rates cannot explain the huge observed income disparity, differences in technology adoption barriers may. The interpretation afforded by the model of each of these four countries' development experience seems quite reasonable. The model is consistent with the development miracle of Japan and the rapid postwar development experiences of France, West Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The problem in economic development is to account for both the great disparity in the wealth of nations and the development experiences of nations, including development miracles. Lucas (1993, p. 252) emphasizes that a theory of economic development must be consistent with a development miracle occurring in South Korea, but not in the Philippines, which appeared to be a very similar economy in 1960. Our theory is that the development miracle of South Korea is the result of reductions in technology adoption barriers in that country, and the absence of such a miracle in the Philippines is the result of no reductions in technology adoption barriers there. Like Lucas (1993, p. 270), we conclude that there must be a large unmeasured investment in the business sector, an investment he views as learning on the job and we view as technology adoption investment."1 We find that for our model to be consistent with both the observed income disparity and development miracles, this investment must be about 40 percent of measured output.
Microeconomic evidence exists to suggest that considerable unmeasured investment occurs in the business sector. For example, profiles of earnings show large increases in earnings with age and tenure (see, e.g., Murphy and Welch 1991; Topel 1991). Another example is that productivity at the firm level shows large increases with firmspecific experience (see Rapping 1965; Irwin and Klenow 1993). Still another is the large investment made by entrepreneurs when they start businesses (see Dahmen 1970) . We would also include trade school training, including forgone wages, as part of our unmeasured technology adoption investment. We emphasize that a better accounting of this unmeasured investment may find that its share is significantly smaller than the 40 percent of measured gross national product required by our theory. If so, this would lead to a rejection of our candidate for a theory of economic development.
Under the assumption that our theory passes this test (and we would be surprised if it did not), the crucial test is to obtain direct measures of the magnitudes of the barriers to technology adoption across countries and to see whether differences in these barriers account for differences in the wealth of nations. If barriers to technology adoption prove to be the key to economic development, then the next step is to understand why barriers vary across countries and across time in a given country.'2 Recent papers (Boldrin and Scheinkman 1988; Backus, Kehoe, and Kehoe 1991) have begun to study the role trade could play in the development process, but our conjecture is that greater trade openness contributes to development because it weakens the forces of resistance to technology adoption. The final step is to design sustainable arrangements (see Chari and Kehoe 1990) with the property that resistance to technology adoption is weak and stays weak.
